between these two sets of factors. In the first study, we investigate to what extent social 23 preferences may have some biological underpinnings. We use simple one-shot distribution 24 experiments to attribute subjects one out of four types of social preferences: Self-interested 25 (SI), Competitive (C), Inequality averse (IA) and Efficiency-seeking (ES). We then 26 investigate whether these four groups display differences in their levels of facial 27
Fluctuating Asymmetry (FA) and in proxies for exposure to testosterone during phoetal 28 development and puberty. We observe that development-related biological features and 29 social preferences are relatively independent. In the second study, we compare the relative 30 weight of these two set of factors by studying how they affect subjects' behaviour in the 31 Ultimatum Game (UG). We find differences in offers made and rejection rates across the 32 four social preference groups. The effect of social preferences is stronger than the effect of 33 biological features even though the latter is significant. We also report a novel link between 34 facial masculinity (a proxy for exposure to testosterone during puberty) and rejection rates 35 in the UG. Our results suggest that biological features influence behaviour both directly and 36 through their relation with the type of social preferences that individuals hold. 37 38 Keywords: Testosterone; Ultimatum Game; Fluctuating Asymmetry; Facial masculinity;
Introduction 41 42
In the last few years, experimental methods have been used to explore how 43 biological features relate to individual behaviour in strategic situations. These laboratory 44 experiments have employed a number of simple games long-studied in Experimental 45
Economics (Smith, 1987) . These games embody simplified social interactions in which the 46 payoffs that subjects obtain depend both on their own decisions and the decisions of others. Research in Experimental Economics typically uses observed choices to uncover 65 unobservable individual heterogeneity in social preferences. This is called the revealed 66 preference approach. On the other hand, research in Biology uses individual heterogeneity 67 (in physiological features, for instance) to explain observed differences in behaviour. The 68 present paper aims at building a bridge between these two approaches. To this end, we run 69 two studies. The first one explores the extent to which individual biological features and 70 social preferences are independent of each other. The second study explores, within the 71 same population, the relative importance of these two sets of variables in strategic 72
interactions by relating them to behaviour in the Ultimatum Game (UG henceforth). 73
74

Study 1 75
In the first step of this study, we use a set of one-shot distribution experiments to 76 classify subjects into one of the main four types of social preferences described in the 77
Experimental Economics literature (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004): Self-interested (SI), 78
Competitive (C), Inequality averse (IA) and Efficiency-seeking (ES). These four types of 79 social preferences translate into different behaviours in economic interactions. SI subjects 80 are mainly interested in maximizing their own payoff. The ES subjects are interested in 81 maximizing the total benefits obtained by all participants, even at their own expense. IA 82 subjects are interested in minimizing the disparity in the distribution of income 83 independently of whether this disparity is in their favour or not. Finally, C subjects are 84 interested in minimizing unfavourable inequality and in maximizing favourable inequality, 85 even at the expense of some material payoff. 86
87
Once classified, we study whether subjects who hold different social preferences 88 display differences in several biological features. The biological features which we consider 89 here are facial Fluctuating Asymmetry (FA, henceforth), and two proxies for testosterone 90 exposure in utero and during puberty, the second to fourth digit ratio (2D:4D) and facial 91 masculinity, respectively. We have chosen these variables because they have showed to 92 influence a number of behaviours (e.g. tendency to cooperate, competitiveness), which are 93 affected by social preferences as well. Their impact on adult behaviour operates through 94 their effect on nervous system development (Bates, 2007; Berenbaum & Beltz 2011) . 95
96
FA refers to minor non-directional deviations from bilateral symmetry (Palmer & 97 Strobeck, 1986) . It is considered to be the result of developmental instability. Many studies 98
show a link between symmetry and individual fitness, both in non-humans (Møller, 1997 ; 99 between SI an ES subjects, as SI subjects do not care about the outcome received by others 143 whereas ES subjects care mostly about joint welfare. 144
145
Study 2 146
In the second study, we compare the relative importance of individual biological 147 features and social preferences in strategic interactions by looking at subjects' behaviour in 148 the UG. In this experiment, two players have to divide a sum of money. The first player 149 proposes how to divide the sum between the two players. The second player can either 150 accept or reject this proposal. A rejection implies that both players receive nothing. 151
Acceptance implies that the money is split according to the proposal. This game is well 152 suited for our purposes because of two reasons. First, it is well-known that behaviour in the 153 UG departs substantially from the standard economic prediction of own income 154 maximization. Pure self-interest dictates that responders should accept any positive offer 155 and that proposers should make the lowest possible offer. However, low offers are often 156 rejected and the vast majority of offers range between 30% and 50% of the sum to be 157 distributed (Roth, 1995) . The second reason is that the UG has been widely employed in the 158 study of the effects of hormones on behaviour (Kosfeld et In the role of responders, we expect SI and ES subjects to accept lower offers than 164 the rest of participants; the SI group because they prefer any positive amount of money to 165 nothing, and the latter because rejection entails the loss of the whole amount to be 166 distributed. On the other hand, C subjects should reject low offers more often because 167 acceptance would leave them significantly worse off than the proposer. IA subjects should 168 reject low offers too in order to avoid a high disparity in the earnings of the two 169 participants. In the role of proposers, we expect IA and ES subjects to make higher offers 170 than the rest, given that IA agents care strongly about equality and that ES subjects can 171 reduce the risk of rejection (that would lead to the whole sum being wasted) by doing so. 172
This leads us to expect that the offers made by SI and C subjects should be lower in average 
Measurement of individual biological features 218
Photographs of the participants and scans of their hands were taken before each 219 session. We took high-resolution full frontal facial colour photographs of all participants 220 with an Olympus E-500 digital camera. The photos were taken in homogeneous conditions 221 (soft light, fixed distance of the camera, completely opened zoom to avoid any optical 222 distortion). Participants were asked to remove any facial adornment and to pose with a 223 neutral expression. We tried to minimize any distortion caused by the rotation of the head 224 by asking subjects to look directly into the camera, and by correcting their position if 225 necessary (instead of using a more osteological standardization, such as the Frankfort 226 Horizontal). We took three images of each participant. 227 
Study 1 266
In the first study, we measured social preferences with a sequence of two-choice 267 questions presented to subjects, our Social Preferences Test (SPT). Answering to a 268 sequence of questions is a method commonly employed when measuring social preferences 269 (Van Lange et al., 1997).The choices in the SPT were two distributions of points between 270 the subject and a counterpart. Subjects were told that this counterpart was a participant in 271 future experimental sessions. In the first pair of choices, subjects had to choose between 272 distribution A= {20, 30} and distribution B= {30, 80}, where the first figure indicates the 273 number of points allocated to the subject making the choice. These distributions displayed 274 inequality unfavourable to the subject. In the second pair of distributions, the inequality 275 was favourable to the subject, who was asked to choose between distribution C= {70, 10} 276 and D= {60, 50}. These two pairs of distributions are such that the four possible different 277 profiles of choices correspond to four different types of social preferences. The choice {B,13 C} corresponds to SI subjects, that is, those mostly interested in maximizing the amount of 279 points they receive. The choice {B, D} corresponds to ES subjects, that is, those interested 280 in maximizing the total sum of points. The choice {A, D} corresponds to IA subjects 281 because those choices yield the most egalitarian distribution of points within each pair. 282
Finally, we attribute the remaining choice to C subjects, that is, those interested in 283 minimizing unfavourable inequality and in maximizing favourable inequality, even at the 284 expense of some material payoff. 285 2013, we checked the reliability of our SPT by asking these participants to answer again the 311
SPT through e-mail (but without a payment). We recruited 79 of the initial 106 participants. 312
Of these participants, 84.8% (n=67) did not change of SPT group. The more stable group 313 was SI (94.4% of the initial SI maintained this classification). The most frequent change in 314 group was between IA and EM (3 of the 13 initial IA became classified as EM). 315
316
Study 2 317
In the second study, participants took part in four one-shot UGs. Participants were 318 asked to make choices in both roles, as responders and as proposers. In order to avoid 319 competitive effects within each group of participants, subjects were playing each time 320 against a participant not present in the room. As proposers, subjects could offer any integer 321 amount of points between 0 and 100p to a future participant. As responders, they played 322 three times; they were told that they were playing against three previous participants. Each 323 time they had to accept or reject a different offer: a low offer (15p), an intermediate offer 324
(30p) and a high offer (50p). The order of these three offers was randomly chosen in eachsession. Given that subjects had to make an offer to a future participant as proposers, it was 326 natural for them to receive offers from previous participants in the role of responders. We 327 chose this design over asking subjects for their minimal acceptable offer because that 328 design makes less clear for subjects how choices determine payments. The high offer (50p) 329 served as a control to ensure that subjects understood the experiment. All subjects accepted 330 that offer, so we will not include it in any further analysis. 331 332
Statistical analyses 333
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the morphological variables we employ. We 334 tested the normality of these variables with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Masculinity and 335 2D:4D are normally distributed. We log transformed FA after multiplying the measure by 336 100 (in order to avoid negative values which could complicate the interpretation of its 337 effects). Offer was resistant to any transformation into normality, so when performing any 338 analysis with this variable we used non-parametric methods. To analyze the results we 339 employed ANOVA and student-t test for differences in normally distributed variables, 340
Kruskal-Wallis H for non-normally distributed variables (i.e., Offer) and chi square test 341 when comparing nominal variables. When analyzing correlation between variables, we 342 used the non-parametric Spearman ρ . We also employed logistic regressions to analyze 343 simultaneously the effect of several independent variables on our dichotomous dependent 344 variables (acceptance or rejection of the low and medium offers). These analyses were 345 made following the recommendations in Kleinbaum & Klein (2002) . First, the effects of 346 individual variables were analyzed independently. New variables were subsequently added 347 to these models. We do not report results on interactions between variables because they 348
were not significant. We employed SPSS15 in all our statistical analysis.
Results 350 351
Study 1 352
In the first study, we classified the 152 subjects according to their answers in the 353 SPT. The most common social preference group among our participants was SI (51.32%, 354 n=78), followed by C (23.03%, n=35), ES (20.39%, n=31), and finally IA (5.26%, n=8). 355
There were statistically significant differences (Chi square test, χ between subjects who were studying Economics (n=55) and those who were studying 357 Biology (n=81); the former type of students displayed a higher proportion of SI subjects 358 (SI=61.8%; ES=21.8%; C=16.4%; IA=0%) whereas the latter displayed a higher proportion 359 of C subjects (SI=44.4%; ES=18.5%; C=27.2%; IA=9.9%). 360
361
Next we analyzed how biological features varied across these groups (Figure 1 ). We 362 found no significant differences in 2D:4D (ANOVA, F 148, 3 =0.746, p=0.527) nor in facial 363 masculinity (F 148, 3 =0.579, p=0.630). We also found that, as we initially conjectured, SI 364 subjects show lower levels of FA than ES subjects (t test, t 107 =2.043, p=0.043). Differences 365
are not significant across all four groups (F 148, 3 =2.056, p=0.109), although they follow the 366 predicted pattern (see Figure 1) . 367
368
Study 2 369
In the role of proposers, the average offer made across all subjects was 44.84 points. 370
We found significant differences in the average offer across groups (Kruskal-Wallis test, 371 H 3 =9.598, p=0.022). Regarding their behaviour as responders, 31.57% of subjects rejected the medium 377 offer whereas 58.55% rejected the low offer. There were significant differences in rejection 378 rates across the SPT groups, both for the medium (Chi square test, χ Figure 1 shows that, as expected, SI and ES agents 380 accept both offers more often, whereas C subjects reject them more frequently. 381
382
As the first step in the simultaneous analysis of the importance of biological features 383 and social preferences, we analyzed the effect of the former set of factors on responders' 384 behaviour (see Table 2 for p-values and statistics). Participants who rejected the low offer 385 had higher facial masculinity than those who accepted it. We found no differences in FA 386 between subjects who accepted or rejected the low offer, in line with previous results in the 387 literature (Zaatari & Trivers, 2007) . We found no significant differences in 2D:4D either, 388 although average digit ratios followed the pattern (lower ratios in participants who rejected 389 the offer) previously reported in the literature (Van den Bergh & Dewitte, 2006). We 390 performed the same analysis for the medium offer and we found identical patterns for the 391 three variables, although none of the differences were statistically significant ("medium 392 offer" row in Table 2) . 393 394 Finally, we evaluated simultaneously the effect of all variables on acceptance rates 395 by running a logit regression analysis (Table 3 ). The analysis of the low offer showed a 396 significant effect of the SPT classification in the same direction as in the results describedabove. Facial masculinity had a negative impact on the acceptance rate of the low offer. 398
The logit analysis of the medium offer yielded that the SPT classification had a significant 399 impact on acceptance rates, whereas no biological variable was found to have a significant 400 effect (lower half of Table 3 In a first study, we found that these two sets of explanations are related only to some 414 extent. Two different social preference groups, SI and ES, which account for 71.71% of the 415 subject pool, displayed differences in FA, a biological feature that has been shown to affect 416 behaviour in economic games. No significant differences were found in facial masculinity 417 or 2D:4D across social preference groups. The link between social preferences and 418 individual biological differences would thus seem of relatively low importance, at least 419 under our measure of social preferences. We measured social preferences by means of theSPT, a set of one-shot distribution experiments whose results are highly consistent with the 421 widely-used Triple-Dominance Measure of SVO (Van Lange et al., 1997). This measure is 422 also highly reliable. The STP is more efficient than the Triple-Dominance Measure of 423 SVO since it classifies all subjects, and it is also finer since it can single out inequality 424 averse subjects. Both the SPT and SVO are designed to shut down strategic concerns such 425 as reciprocity that could potentially confound with purely distributional concerns. However, 426 none of these two measures can rule out that subjects may have reputation-management 427 concerns when making one-shot distributional choices (Trivers, 2004) . than the biological features studied here. When we include both the SPT classification and 439 the set of physiologically-based variables in the analysis of acceptance rates (see Table 3 ), 440 the former is always significant, whereas the latter is significant only for the low offer. This 441 suggests that the importance of biological features might be crowded out by financial 442 incentives. In the role of proposers, there are differences in the amount offered by the four 443 groups, but there is no correlation between the offer made and any biological feature we body mass index and friendliness scores). We did not control for these measures (except for 477 age) and this adds another source of non-comparability. 478
479
The present paper also shows the influence of facial masculinity on behaviour. 480
Facial masculinity is a proxy for exposure to testosterone during puberty (Enlow, 1996) . hypothesis has also been proposed as an explanation of why more facially masculine males 499 tend to take more risks (Apicella et al., 2008 ) and why they show increases in circulating 500 testosterone after a success (Pound et al., 2009 ). Alternatively, as less masculine males are 501 less attractive to females (Johnston, 2006) , their behaviour tends to be more cooperative in 502 order to signal their willingness to deliver high paternal investment and, therefore, their 503 interest in long-term relationships (Takahashi et al., 2006) . 504
505
The present paper aimed to integrate the different approaches used in Economics on 506 the one side and Physiology on the other. Economic behaviour is based on the concept of 507 preferences, which are revealed through individual choices. In Biology, some fundamental 508 individual characteristics, like hormone levels (during development and in adults), have 509 been described to have an impact on behaviour. Our two studies were designed to combine 510 these two approaches and also to evaluate their relative importance. Clearly, the interplay 511 between these two sets of explanations is a very complex issue that deserves further tests 512 and analyses. Competitive (C), Inequality Averse (IA) and Self Interested (the reference group). A series 808 of models were run by including one additional variable at a time. We report only the last 809 of these models. 810 811
